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Abstract
This paper provides a general framework for modeling financial contagion in a system with obligations
in multiple illiquid assets (e.g., currencies). In so doing, we develop a multi-layered financial network that
extends the single network of Eisenberg and Noe [2001]. In particular, we develop a financial contagion
model with fire sales that allows institutions to both buy and sell assets to cover their liabilities in the
different assets and act as utility maximizers.
We prove that, under standard assumptions and without market impacts, equilibrium portfolio hold-
ings exist and are unique. However, with market impacts, we prove that equilibrium portfolio holdings
and market prices exist which clear the multi-layered financial system. In general, though, these clear-
ing solutions are not unique. We extend this result by considering the tâtonnement process to find the
unique attained equilibrium. The attained equilibrium need not be continuous with respect to the initial
shock; these points of discontinuity match those stresses in which a financial crisis becomes a systemic
crisis. We further provide mathematical formulations for payment rules and utility functions satisfying
the necessary conditions for these existence and uniqueness results.
We demonstrate the value of our model through illustrative numerical case studies. In particular, we
study a counterfactual scenario on the event that Greece re-instituted the drachma on a dataset from
the European Banking Authority.
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1 Introduction
As defined in Feinstein [2017], “financial contagion occurs when the distress of one bank jeopardizes the health
of other financial firms.” Many recent works on the topic have focused on modeling aspects of the 2007-2009
financial crisis, as that event proved that systemic crises can have terrible costs. However, such contagious
events have occurred at other times in the recent past, e.g., the 1997 Asian financial crisis. In that crisis,
among others, currency fluctuations between the US dollar and, e.g., Thai baht and Indonesian rupiah caused
the debt-to-income ratios of firms to jump. This caused a positive feedback loop in the currency fluctuations,
thus intensifying the contagion. In fact, Dell’Ariccia et al. [2011] and references therein showed that foreign
currency obligations for banks statistically increase the chance of a banking crisis in a nation. However,
in contrast to the financial contagion models of Eisenberg and Noe [2001], Feinstein [2017], many historical
financial crisis involved obligations and incomes in multiple currencies (that must be fulfilled in the quoted
currency) and illiquidity in the currency markets (see, e.g., Allayannis et al. [2003]). That is, in a general
sense, many historical crises exist as the outcome of a multi-layered financial network of obligations between
financial institutions in multiple illiquid assets insofar as they exhibit three key components: (i) distinct
networks of interbank obligations in each currency with (ii) intra-layer connections via payments made in
the individual currencies and (iii) inter-layer interactions through asset transfers (and price impacts) between
the different currencies and layers of the network. As such, this current paper will focus on an extension of
Eisenberg and Noe [2001] to allow for a multi-layered network of obligations, notably allowing for firms to
transfer wealth between multiple (illiquid) assets or currencies causing price impacts to the exchange rates.
Eisenberg and Noe [2001] propose a network model for the spread of defaults in the financial system.
In that proposed model, banks hold liquid assets which are used to pay off liabilities; unpaid liabilities
may infect additional firms and cause them to default on some of their liabilities as well. That paper
proves conditions for existence and uniqueness of the clearing payments and provides a method for com-
puting the equilibrium clearing payments. This model has been extended to account for time dynam-
ics in, e.g., Kusnetsov and Veraart [2019], Capponi and Chen [2015], Banerjee et al. [2018]. Additionally,
the basic clearing payment model of Eisenberg and Noe [2001] has been relaxed to consider bankruptcy
costs (e.g., Elsinger [2009], Rogers and Veraart [2013], Elliott et al. [2014], Glasserman and Young [2015],
Weber and Weske [2017], Capponi et al. [2016]) and cross-holdings (e.g., Elsinger [2009], Elliott et al. [2014],
Weber and Weske [2017]). Illiquid assets and fire sale dynamics have been included in the setting of such
network models in, e.g., Cifuentes et al. [2005], Nier et al. [2007], Gai and Kapadia [2010], Amini et al.
[2015], Chen et al. [2016], Weber and Weske [2017], Amini et al. [2016] for a single (representative) asset and
Feinstein [2017], Feinstein and El-Masri [2017] for multiple assets. Empirical studies of the aforementioned
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financial contagion models have been conducted in, e.g., Elsinger et al. [2006], Upper [2011], Cont et al.
[2013], Glasserman and Young [2015]. One of the key contributions of these works is the conclusion that
the local connections, via contractual liabilities, do not capture most financial contagion. This motivates
our current study for considering the role of illiquid assets and currencies on financial contagion. Measures
of systemic risk have been studied in, e.g., Chen et al. [2013], Kromer et al. [2016], Feinstein et al. [2017],
Biagini et al. [2019], Armenti et al. [2018].
The main advance that we wish to study in these models is a more complete picture of how illiquid
assets impact systemic risk; in particular, we are concerned with the implications of physical obligations in
multiple currencies. Within this scope, prior work has focused on fire sales in which the various financial
firms will liquidate their assets in case of a cash shortfall thus driving down the asset value. Further, we
will demonstrate that such modeling inherently produces systemic crises due to the market switching the
attained equilibria and thus having jumps in the response of banks and the market. However, to the best
of our knowledge, none of the prior works in the Eisenberg and Noe [2001] setting permit a multi-layered or
interconnected financial network of obligations with liabilities in multiple assets and payments in physical
assets rather than in some numéraire. We refer to Bookstaber and Kenett [2016] for a discussion of why
multi-layered systems are important and can affect financial contagion; this is of particular importance due
to the role that currency movements have on systemic risk (Dell’Ariccia et al. [2011]). In such a model,
firms no longer only have obligations in the numéraire asset (cash) only, but in, e.g., multiple currencies
or securities. We refer to Montagna and Kok [2013], Battiston et al. [2016], Poledna et al. [2015] for other
approaches to modeling interconnected financial networks. We will tackle this problem, and extend works
further, by allowing for solvent firms to invest via a utility maximization problem, thereby permitting such
firms to purchase assets at the fire sale price.
The systemic risk studied in this paper, insofar as it relates to currency crises, should be viewed as
studying extreme events such as the abandonment of a currency peg. If symmetry exists to balance the
buying and selling of a currency (due to the notion of “buy low and sell high” as depicted by the wealth
maximizing utility in Example 5.1), the exchange rates will generally be very stable as illustrated by low
volatility in the foreign exchange markets. However, when an asymmetry exists between initial holdings (in
a local currency) and obligations (in a major currency, e.g., US dollars), and with atypical monetary policy,
the multilayered network can cause large fluctuations in exchange rates. It is this latter scenario we concern
ourselves with in this work.
Notably, we will prove only the existence of clearing solutions in markets with price impacts. This is
comparable to, e.g., Cifuentes et al. [2005], in which the clearing payments are not necessarily unique due to
the introduction of fire sales. In order to determine the attained clearing solution, we introduce the use of
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the tâtonnement process which has previously been used to study financial contagion in Bluhm et al. [2014].
Of particular interest, due to the nonuniqueness of the clearing solutions, the attained equilibria need not be
continuous with respect to the initial shock. Specifically, this jump implies that a small perturbation in shock
can greatly influence the attained clearing solution. This has far reaching consequences for stress testing
as discrete stresses may miss this point of discontinuity and thus underestimate the true risk of financial
contagion.
The organization of this paper is as follows. First, in Section 2, we will introduce the mathematical
and financial setting. In Section 3, we first develop the general modeling framework. We consider markets
without price impacts (Section 3.1) followed by markets with price impacts (Section 3.2). We find conditions
so that there exists a clearing solution (Section 3.2) and consider the tâtonnoment process to find the attained
market equilibrium (Section 3.3). These are the main results of this work. Section 4 is used to provide specific
mathematical examples with meaningful financial interpretations that fit the results of Sections 3. Numerical
case studies are provided in Section 5. In particular, beyond demonstrating the impact of differing choices of
payment rules and utility parameters on the equilibrium response in toy models, we provide a numerical case
study to consider the impacts on contagion of having a single currency split into two. This is meaningful
as it has been threatened in recent years for the Greek economy; in studying the so-called Grexit event, we
calibrate the financial system to 2011 stress testing data from the European Banking Authority. The proofs
of the theoretical results are provided in the appendix.
2 The stylized balance sheet
Consider a financial system with n financial institutions (e.g., banks, hedge funds, or pension plans) and a
financial market with m illiquid assets (possibly currencies). We denote by y ∈ Rn×m+ the realized portfolio
holdings of the institutions and by q ∈ Rm++ the prices of the assets in some numéraire. We assume throughout
4
Marked-to-Market Book Value
Assets Liabilities
Endowment (Asset 1)
q1x
1
i
Interbank (Asset 1)
q1
∑n
j=1 L
1
ji
Endowment (Asset 2)
q2x
2
i
Interbank (Asset 2)
q2
∑n
j=1 L
2
ji
Total (Asset 1)
q1p¯
1
i
Total (Asset 2)
q2p¯
2
i
Book Capital
(a) Marked-to-market book for firm i, i.e. assuming all
liabilities are paid in full.
Marked-to-Market Realized Balance Sheet
Assets Liabilities
Endowment (Asset 1)
q1x
1
i
Interbank (Asset 1)
q1
∑n
j=1 a
1
ji[p¯
1
j ∧ y1j ]
Endowment (Asset 2)
q2x
2
i
Interbank (Asset 2)
q2
∑n
j=1 a
2
ji[p¯
2
j ∧ y2j ]
Total (Asset 1)
q1p¯
1
i
Total (Asset 2)
q2p¯
2
i
Realized Capital
(b) Marked-to-market balance sheet for firm i before
transferring assets to cover liabilities.
Marked-to-Market Realized Holdings and Balance Sheet
Assets Liabilities
Holdings (Asset 1)
q1y
1
i
Holdings (Asset 2)
q2y
2
i
Transferred
Assets
2 ⇒ 1
Total (Asset 1)
q1p¯
1
i
Total (Asset 2)
q2p¯
2
i
Realized Capital
(c) Marked-to-market balance sheet for firm i after
transferring assets to cover liabilities.
Figure 1: Stylized balance sheet for firm i under price vector q.
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that the price of each asset is bounded away from zero. Throughout this paper we will use the notation
a ∧ b :=


min(a11, b11) min(a12, b12) . . . min(a1d2 , b1d2)
min(a21, b21) min(a22, b22) . . . min(a2d2 , b2d2)
...
...
. . .
...
min(ad11, bd11) min(ad12, bd12) . . . min(ad1d2 , bd1d2)


,
a ∨ b :=


max(a11, b11) max(a12, b12) . . . max(a1d2 , b1d2)
max(a21, b21) max(a22, b22) . . . max(a2d2 , b2d2)
...
...
. . .
...
max(ad11, bd11) max(ad12, bd12) . . . max(ad1d2 , bd1d2)


where a, b ∈ Rd1×d2 for some d1, d2 ∈ N. Additionally let a+ := a ∨ 0 and a− := (−a) ∨ 0 where a ∈ Rd for
some d ∈ N.
As described in Eisenberg and Noe [2001], any financial agent i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}may be a creditor or obligor
to other agents. However, in contrast to Eisenberg and Noe [2001], we consider these liabilities in multiple
currencies that must be fulfilled in the physical assets rather than some numéraire. This distinction, while
unimportant in frictionless markets, will be necessary in Section 3.2 when considering the impact on prices
caused by the transactions undertaken by the firms. Let Lkij ≥ 0 be the contractual obligation of firm i
towards firm j in asset k. Further, we assume that no firm has an obligation to itself in any asset, i.e.,
Lkii = 0. The total liabilities of agent i in asset k are given by
p¯ki :=
n∑
j=1
Lkij .
We can define the vector p¯k ∈ Rn+ as the vector of total obligations of each firm in asset k. On the asset
side of the balance sheet, each firm i = 1, 2, ..., n has an initial endowment of xki ≥ 0 in each k = 1, 2, ...,m
asset. We refer to Figure 1a for a visual representation of the stylized book value of assets and liabilities
for a representative firm with m = 2 assets and with market prices q ∈ Rm++. Though firms may alter
their borrowing based on market prices due to, e.g., new monetary policy in response to altered exchange
rates, modifying the balance sheet in such a way is outside the scope of the current work. We refer to
Schuldenzucker et al. [2017a,b], Banerjee and Feinstein [2019] for consideration of contingent liabilities in
the single (m = 1) asset setting.
The relative liabilities of firm i to firm j in asset k, i.e., the fractional amount of total liabilities of firm
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i towards firm j in asset k, are given by
akij =


Lkij
p¯k
i
if p¯ki > 0
1
n
if p¯ki = 0
.
We define the matrices Ak = (akij)i,j=1,2,...,n with the property (by construction)
∑n
j=1 a
k
ij = 1 for any i
and k. In the case that p¯ki = 0 we are able to choose a
k
ij arbitrarily, we let a
k
ij =
1
n
in that case so that
the summation is equal to 1. Any financial firm may default on their obligations in asset k if they do not
hold a sufficient number of that asset. We assume, as per Eisenberg and Noe [2001], that in case of default
the realized payments will be made in proportion to the size of the obligations, i.e., based on the relative
liabilities matrix Ak and without prioritization of payments to any firm. That is, the realized value (in
physical units) of firm i’s interbank assets in asset k is given by
n∑
j=1
akji[p¯
k
j ∧ ykj ]
when firm j 6= i holds ykj units of asset k. Encoded in this equation is the notion that if firm j has more
assets than liabilities in asset k then it will pay out in full (akjip¯
k
j = L
k
ji), otherwise it will pay out its holdings
proportionally to what it owes. This realized balance sheet is depicted in Figure 1b with m = 2 assets and
with market prices q ∈ Rm++.
As we consider the setting in which all liabilities must be paid in physical assets, we need to consider an
additional step to find the realized holdings for each bank in the system. For instance, Figure 1b depicts the
firm with positive mark-to-market capital, but a deficit in the first asset. Thus, as depicted in Figure 1c,
they would have to transfer some units of the second asset so as to cover this liability. As Figure 1c
considers the frictionless market, the realized capital for the firm before and after the transaction will remain
constant, and as such this system is functionally equivalent to (a generalization of) the payment model from
Eisenberg and Noe [2001]. However, if price impacts were introduced (see Section 3.2) then more complicated
firm behavior needs to be considered and a reduction to mark-to-market values is insufficient to describe the
entire system. The details of the firm behavior through a utility maximization problem is provided in the
next section.
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3 The model
In this section we will first introduce the clearing framework for multi-currency obligations without price
impacts. In this setting we provide results on existence and uniqueness, which generalizes those results
from Eisenberg and Noe [2001], Elsinger [2009]. In this case we are able to consider a fictitious default
algorithm as was first considered in Eisenberg and Noe [2001]. The framework without price impacts is of
interest because it is mathematically tractable. Additionally, from a financial perspective it is of interest
due to the generality of the payment schemes provided herein as well as allowing for clear heterogeneous
shocks to the various institutions. Under such a setting the use of multi-layered networks is unnecessary as
an approach with appropriate prioritization of payments as in Elsinger [2009] can be taken instead on the
marked-to-market wealth. However, with these results, we introduce price impacts due to the transfer of
assets undertaken by the firms. These market impacts cannot be wholly described with only the marked-
to-market wealths and thus require the use of vector-valued, i.e. multi-layered, networks. We conclude this
section by considering the resultant equilibrium exchange rates achieved after an initial shock to the asset
values. This allows us to classify when the system of banks exacerbates, and when it mitigates, the effects
of a financial crisis.
We wish to compare this model with prior notions of fire sales in the Eisenberg and Noe [2001] framework,
e.g. Weber and Weske [2017]. In such works, all obligations are denominated in the same (cash) asset and
illiquid assets are sold at a discount in order to cover these cash shortfalls. By taking such an approach,
the monotonicity of the clearing mechanism is immediate and Tarski’s fixed point provides existence of
clearing payments and prices. However, in this work, banks are given freedom to both buy and sell assets
so as to cover their obligations (in multiple assets) and to, for instance, purchase assets at a discount so
as to increase their utility. The existence of clearing prices and portfolio holdings requires more thorough
comparative static results (that are provided in the appendix), and ultimately does not result in a lattice of
equilibrium solutions.
3.1 Financial contagion without market impacts
Fix the behavior of all firms but firm i, i.e., the amount of each asset that all firms but i hold is y−i ∈ R(n−1)×m+
(with firm j holding yj ∈ Rm+ ), and the relative prices is given by the vector q ∈ Rm++. The amount of each
asset that firm i has immediately available due to the payments from the other firms is given by

xki + n∑
j=1
akji
[
p¯kj ∧ ykj
]
k=1,2,...,m
.
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As described in Eisenberg and Noe [2001], and depicted in Figure 1b, firms have available the sum of the
endowment xki and the realized interbank assets
∑n
j=1 a
k
ji[p¯
k
j ∧ykj ]. Following the concept of limited liabilities
(i.e., no firm pays more than it owes) and absolute priority (i.e., no firm accumulates positive equity until
all debts are paid in full), the holdings of firm i are such that
(
∃k∗ ∈ {1, 2, ...,m} : yk∗i > p¯k
∗
i
)
⇒ yi ≥ p¯i.
We assume that additional regulatory rules apply to the multi-asset payments. That is, regulators may en-
force, e.g., a prioritized payment (as in, e.g., Elsinger [2009]) or pro-rata payment (as in, e.g., Eisenberg and Noe
[2001]) between different assets or currencies. These rules are encoded in some monotonic, strictly concave,
and supermodular payment utility function hi. The payments made by firm i are given by
Pi(y, q) = argmax
pi∈[0,p¯i]

hi(pi; y−i, q)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
k=1
qkp
k
i ≤
m∑
k=1
qk

xki + n∑
j=1
akji
[
p¯kj ∧ ykj
]

 . (1)
The payment function Pi is defined, given the portfolio holdings of all other firms and the prevailing market
price, so that the mark-to-market value of the payments does not exceed the available marked-to-market
realized assets. Additionally, by constraining the payments between 0 and p¯i, we enforce the limited liabilities
assumption. The inclusion of the payment utility function hi is to guarantee that the resultant payments will
satisfy the desired regulatory environment (e.g., prioritization or proportionality). We refer to Section 4.1 for
constructions of the payment utility function under financially interesting regulations. This payment scheme
is general enough to cover regulatory environments beyond the standard frameworks in the literature, i.e.
proportional and prioritized payments, to include, e.g., a surplus repayment scheme described in Example 4.1.
However, firm i may choose to trade more assets than required to make its payments; this additional
trading will be done in order to optimize some utility function ui. To guarantee absolute priority, the final
number of assets that firm i holds must exceed, in each asset, the payment Pi(y, q). In this way the utility
function is redundant, and unnecessary, for firms that are insolvent as they must cover exactly their payments
Pi(y, q). Further, we constrain the actions of each bank so that it can obtain its desired portfolio without
loss of mark-to-market valuation from its marked-to-market assets. Thus the vector of asset holdings for
firm i is given by the bilevel program
yi ∈ Yi(y, q) = argmax
ei∈R
m
+

ui(ei; y−i, q)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ei ≥ Pi(y, q),∑m
k=1 qke
k
i ≤
∑m
k=1 qk
(
xki +
∑n
j=1 a
k
ji
[
p¯kj ∧ y∗kj
])

 . (2)
By enforcing the non-negativity constraint, we encode a no-short selling assumption. Note that we allow firms
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to throw away wealth in determining their final portfolio holdings. While mathematically this is possible,
all examples considered herein will guarantee that any value in Yi(y, q) will have terminal (mark-to-market)
wealth equal to the value of the firm’s assets.
With the given rules for repayment and firm behaviors, we are able to fully describe the clearing mecha-
nism for asset holdings. Given an asset holding matrix y ∈ Rn×m+ and pricing vector q ∈ Rm++ the updated
asset holdings are given by the clearing mechanism Y where (Yi)i=1,2,...,n is given in (2). Implicitly within
this clearing mechanism, the regulatory agency has a role to play by specifying the payment utility function
which determines the payment function Pi (defined in (1)) for each firm i.
We use the clearing mechanism to compute the realized holdings y(q) ∈ Rn×m+ under the pricing vector
q ∈ Rm++. This is provided by a fixed point of the clearing mechanism, i.e.,
y(q) ∈ Y (y(q), q).
We now consider conditions for the existence of maximal and minimal clearing solutions y(q), which is the
general property satisfied in the Eisenberg-Noe model, under a crisis price of q. These results are then used
to prove a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the clearing solution by guaranteeing that the maximal
and minimal solutions must coincide. Note that, due to the generality of the payment scheme, encoded by
the payment utility functions, it is not possible to directly apply the results of Eisenberg and Noe [2001] on
the marked-to-market assets and liabilities for each firm; however, in the special case discussed in Remark 3.3
below this approach could be taken. Additionally, due to the utility maximizing behavior of the regulators
(through the payment utility function) and solvent banks (through the utility functions), we must consider
comparative statics of the bilevel optimization problems for each firm to prove the result as provided in the
appendix.
Lemma 3.1. Fix a price q ∈ Rm++. Let the payment utility functions hi : [0, p¯i] × R(n−1)×m+ × Rm++ → R
be strictly increasing, strictly concave, and supermodular in its first argument. Let the utility functions
ui : R
m
+ × R(n−1)×m+ × Rm++ → R be concave and supermodular in its first argument. Additionally assume
that Yi(y, q) (defined in (2)) is singleton-valued for any y ∈ Rn×m and for all agents i.
(i) There exists a greatest and least clearing holdings y↑(q) ≥ y↓(q) satisfying y = Y (y, q).
(ii) The positive equity of all firms is equal for every fixed point, i.e., (y↑i (q) − p¯i)+ = (y↓i (q) − p¯i)+ for
every firm i.
These results on a greatest and least clearing portfolio holdings generalize Theorem 1 of Eisenberg and Noe
[2001]. In fact in the m = 1 asset case, all payment utility functions and utility functions satisfying the con-
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ditions of Lemma 3.1 (for example setting hi(pi; y−i, q) := p
2
i and ui(ei; y−i, q) := ei) recover exactly the
Eisenberg-Noe payments and assets as given by Theorem 1 of Eisenberg and Noe [2001].
In the following corollary, we introduce an additional node to the financial system. Denoted as node
0, this “firm” represents all institutions and persons not included in the system of n banks. This notion is
developed in more detail in, e.g., Glasserman and Young [2015], Feinstein et al. [2017]. In particular, we will
assume that this “societal node” acts as a sink to the system, i.e., it has no obligations into the network.
This is incorporated in the assumption that the societal node will never default on its obligations as the
initial endowments come from outside the original system. If a default of node 0 were desired, this could be
included by stressing the initial endowments of the n firms.
Corollary 3.2. Consider the setting of Lemma 3.1. If Lki0 > 0 and L
k
0i = 0 for every firm i and asset k
then the equilibrium holdings under price q ∈ Rm++ is unique, i.e., y∗(q) := y↑(q) = y↓(q).
Remark 3.3. Under specific choices of payment utility and utility functions hi and ui satisfying the condi-
tions of Lemma 3.1, we can give weaker conditions for uniqueness. For instance, under proportional transfers
(see Example 4.2 with µ = 0) with minimal trading (see Example 4.3) if (q∗Tx,
∑m
k=1 q
∗
kL
k) is a regular net-
work in the setting of Eisenberg and Noe [2001] (i.e., all firms have a directed path, possibly of length 0, to
a firm with positive endowment, see Definition 5 of Eisenberg and Noe [2001]) then the clearing holdings are
unique.
We will introduce a modified version of the fictitious default algorithm from Eisenberg and Noe [2001],
Rogers and Veraart [2013], Weber and Weske [2017], Amini et al. [2016], Feinstein [2017] for the construction
of the greatest portfolio holdings y↑(q) under price q ∈ Rm++. In particular, as with the prior fictitious
default algorithms, this algorithm will converge after at most n iterations since the set of defaulting banks is
monotonic. Though this algorithm converges within the finite number of iterations, it includes a fixed point
problem in each iteration as is also the case in, e.g., Weber and Weske [2017], Amini et al. [2016].
Algorithm 3.4. Consider the setting of Lemma 3.1 such that, additionally,
hi(pi; y−i, q) = hi(pi; p¯−i ∧ y−i, q)
ui(ei; y−i, q) = ui(ei; p¯−i ∧ y−i, q)
for every firm i and every pi ∈ [0, p¯i], ei ∈ Rm+ , y−i ∈ R(n−1)×m+ , and q ∈ [q, q]. The greatest portfolio
holdings y↑(q) under price q ∈ Rm++ can be found by the following algorithm in at most n iterations of the
following. Initialize α = 0, pα = p¯, and Dα = ∅. Repeat until convergence:
(i) Increment α = α+ 1;
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(ii) For any firm i = 1, 2, ..., n and asset k = 1, 2, ...,m, define the portfolio holdings by yαik = xik +∑n
j=1 a
k
jip
α−1
jk ;
(iii) Denote the set of insolvent banks by Dα :=
{
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} | qT(yαi − p¯) < 0
}
;
(iv) If Dα = Dα−1 then exit loop;
(v) Define the matrix Λα ∈ {0, 1}n×n so that Λαij =


1 if i = j ∈ Dα
0 else
. pα = pˆ is the maximal solution to
the following fixed point problem
pˆ = (I − Λα) p¯+ ΛαP ((I − Λα)p¯+ Λαpˆ, q) . (3)
After terminating the loop the clearing holdings can be computed by y = Y (pα, q).
The additional condition required for Algorithm 3.4 for the payment utility and utility functions states
firm i determines how much it pays or holds based only on the payments of the other firms p¯−i ∧ y−i and
not on the actualized holdings of the other firms y−i.
We will finish our discussion of the equilibrium portfolio holdings without price impacts by considering
a simple two bank example for which the clearing solution can be computed analytically. We will refer back
to this example at the end of the section on price impacts and attained equilibria as well.
x1 = (0, 2)
T x2 = (2, 0)
T
L12 = (1, 0)
T
L21 = (0, 1)
T
Figure 2: Example 3.5: A graphical representation of the network model with 2 banks and 2 assets which
accepts more than one clearing solution.
Example 3.5. Consider the network with n = 2 banks and m = 2 assets depicted in Figure 2. That is,
the first institution holds 2 units of the second asset and owes 1 in the first asset to the second institution;
vice versa the second institution holds 2 units of the first assets and owes 1 in the second asset to the
first institution. Note that any choice of (hi)i=1,2 satisfying the conditions of Lemma 3.1 is equivalent in
equilibrium since, for both banks, all obligations are only in single assets. Consider a utility function ui that
minimizes the total amount of trading in the market (see Example 4.3 below for more details). Without
loss of generality we will let asset 1 denote the numéraire asset (i.e., q1 = 1 throughout this example). As
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discussed in Remark 3.3, for any price q2 > 0, this system will have a unique clearing solution given by:
y∗1(q) =

 min (1, 3q2)
(2 + min (1, 3/q2)− 1/q2)+

 and y∗2(q) =

 (2 + min (1, 3q2)− q2)+
min (1, 3/q2)

 .
3.2 Financial contagion with market impacts
The results on the clearing portfolio holdings without market impacts generalize the results of Eisenberg and Noe
[2001]. In fact in the m = 1 asset case, all payment utility functions and utility functions satisfying the con-
ditions of Lemma 3.1 (for example setting hi(pi; y−i, q) := p
2
i and ui(ei; y−i, q) := ei) recover exactly the
Eisenberg-Noe payments and assets as given by Theorem 1 of Eisenberg and Noe [2001] if there are no mar-
ket impacts. However, market impacts (due to asset transfers undertaken by the firms) introduce further
feedback effects on the firms and cannot be considered in the m = 1 scheme from Eisenberg and Noe [2001].
In this section, we will first introduce the inverse demand functions, which we use to model the market
impacts of firm behavior. We will then use this model of market impacts to consider the existence of clearing
prices and portfolio holdings, thus generalizing the prior section.
The price of the assets is given by a vector valued inverse demand function F : Rm → [q, q] ⊆ Rm+ for
minimum and maximum prices q = (1, q
2
, . . . , q
m
)T and q = (1, q2, . . . , qm)
T where the first asset is the
numéraire. The inverse demand function maps the quantity of each asset to be sold into a price per unit in
the numéraire. The liquidation value, in the numéraire, of the portfolio z ∈ Rm is thus given by zTF (z). We
will impose the following assumption for the remainder of this paper.
Assumption 3.6. The inverse demand function F : Rm → [q, q] ⊆ Rm++ is continuous and nonincreasing.
For simplicity, the inverse demand function has the form F (z) := (1, f2(z2), . . . , fm(zm))T for every z ∈ Rm.
Remark 3.7. In the construction of the inverse demand function, we choose to take the first asset to be
the numéraire asset. However, this assumption need not be made for the results of this work. In fact,
a fictitious numéraire asset can be chosen instead and thus we would choose q
1
< q1 and some function
f1(z1) would be necessary as well. Further, the assumption that no cross impacts exist in the pricing can
be eliminated without affecting the results of this work so long as the inverse demand function is continuous
and nonincreasing.
Remark 3.8. Rather than introduce a numéraire, we can substitute the bid-ask matrix (see, e.g., Schachermayer
[2004]) with components πk1k2(z) :=
Fk2 (z)
Fk1 (z)
for the inverse demand function. Equivalently, from the bid-ask
matrix Π : Rm → Rm×m++ , we can construct a set of inverse demand functions such that the first asset is the
numéraire asset by defining Fk(z) := π1k(z). Similarly, rather than introduce the inverse demand function,
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we could consider the demand curve for the nonbanking sector (as done in, e.g., Capponi and Larsson [2015]).
We consider the inverse demand function since it simplifies the formulations of this paper, though it can be
constructed from the demand curve of the nonbanking sector.
Additionally, though not needed for the results of this paper, we will generally assume that the inverse
demand function satisfies the condition that z ∈ Rm 7→ zTF (z) is a strictly increasing mapping. That is, the
liquidation value of a portfolio is strictly increasing as portfolio holdings get larger. Note that we consider
this for portfolios with short positions, i.e., zk < 0, as well.
Remark 3.9. In the case when there arem = 2 assets, following Assumption 3.6, we will assume throughout
that F1 ≡ 1 and F2(z) := f2(z2) for every z ∈ R2 for some continuous and nonincreasing inverse demand
function f2 : R → [q2, q2]. That is, the first asset will act as the numéraire asset and the price of the
second asset will depend only on the number of units being bought or sold in that asset. In prior works,
e.g. Cifuentes et al. [2005], Amini et al. [2016], Feinstein [2017], the inverse demand function is only defined
as being a function of non-negative units being sold; using a symmetric argument, we can define an inverse
demand function on the entire real line from this half-line inverse demand function. Consider fˆ : R+ → [q2, 1]
to be a continuous and nonincreasing inverse demand function such that α(z2) := z2fˆ(z2) is strictly increasing
in z2 ∈ R+. Then we can define the full inverse demand function in a symmetric way as
F2(z) :=


fˆ(z2) if z2 ≥ 0
1
fˆ(α−1(−z2))
if z2 < 0
. (4)
The notion of symmetry is due to the fact that selling z2 units of the second asset is equivalent to purchasing
α(z2) units of the first asset (i.e., selling −α(z2) units). Thus, when purchasing |z2| units of asset 2, for
z2 < 0, we can consider selling α
−1(−z2) units of the first asset. With the added assumption that the first
asset has the same inverse demand function fˆ (when selling units of asset 1 denominated in the second asset),
and changing numéraire back to asset 1, results in the inverse demand function as presented in (4).
With the model of price impacts, given by the inverse demand function F , we want to return again to
the clearing model for firm portfolio holdings. Given an initial price q0 ∈ [q, q], Section 3.1 provides the firm
behavior y∗(q0). However, if these sales are actualized, this leads to an updated price q due to the market
impact of the transfers undertaken by each firm. In particular, the updated prices are a function of the net
difference between what is initially available to each firm and the final holdings. The initial shock q0 ∈ [q, q]
would be generated by actions from agents outside our system. That is, initially some quantity γ0 ∈ Rm is
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transacted so that q0 = F (γ0). The clearing prices, subject to the initial shock q0, are thus given by
q = F

γ0 + n∑
i=1

xki + n∑
j=1
akji
[
p¯kj ∧ y∗kj (q)
] − y∗ki (q)


k=1,2,...,m


= F

γ0 + n∑
i=1
xi +
n∑
j=1
([
n∑
i=1
akji
] [
p¯kj ∧ y∗kj (q)
])
k=1,2,...,m
−
n∑
i=1
y∗i (q)


= F
(
γ0 +
n∑
i=1
(xi + [p¯i ∧ y∗i (q)]− y∗i (q))
)
. (5)
With the feedback effects from the inverse demand function, there is the potential for increased contagion
than the initial shock propagating through the no market impact case of Section 3.1 or the single asset setting
of Eisenberg and Noe [2001]. However, if firms choose to purchase a distressed asset due to the decrease in
price, it is possible that a mitigating feedback loop is instituted that will ultimately cause fewer defaults and
improved exchange rates compared to the initial shock q0.
For the ease of utilizing these results, we will now provide a summary of all assumptions for Corollary 3.11.
These are exactly those from Corollary 3.2, Assumption 3.6, and assuming both types of utility functions
are jointly continuous.
Assumption 3.10. Let the network be such that all firms have obligations to a societal node and no obli-
gations from such a node in each asset, i.e., Lki0 > 0 and L
k
0i = 0 for every firm i and asset k. Let the
inverse demand function F : Rm → [q, q] satisfy Assumption 3.6, i.e., be continuous and nonincreasing.
Let the payment utility functions hi : [0, p¯i] × R(n−1)×m+ × Rm++ → R be strictly increasing, strictly concave,
and supermodular in its first argument and jointly continuous for every bank i. Let the utility functions
ui : R
m
+ × R(n−1)×m+ × Rm++ → R be concave and supermodular in its first argument and jointly continuous
for every bank i. Additionally assume that Yi(y, q) (defined in (2)) is singleton-valued for any y ∈ Rn×m and
for all agents i.
Corollary 3.11. Let Assumption 3.10 hold. Let γ0 ∈ Rm be an initial set of transactions that result in a
price shock q0 = F (γ0) ∈ [q, q]. There exists a fixed point price
q∗ = F
(
γ0 +
n∑
i=1
(xi + [p¯i ∧ y∗i (q∗)]− y∗i (q∗))
)
and resultant portfolio holdings y∗(q∗).
In comparison to prior works in the Eisenberg-Noe framework, the existence of the clearing prices does
not follow from a monotonicity argument with Tarski’s fixed point, but rather from Brouwer’s fixed point
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theorem (as detailed in the appendix).
Remark 3.12. Assumption 3.10 can be weakened and still guarantee existence of joint clearing portfolio
holdings and prices. In fact, there exists joint clearing holdings and prices so long as:
• the payment utility functions hi are jointly continuous and both strictly increasing and strictly quasi-
concave in their first argument,
• the utility functions ui are jointly continuous and quasi-concave in their first argument, and
• the inverse demand function F satisfies Assumption 3.6.
This can be proven using an iterated application of the Berge Maximum Theorem (see, e.g., Theorem
17.31 in Aliprantis and Border [2007]) for Pi and Yi followed by an application of the Kakutani Fixed Point
Theorem (see, e.g., Theorem 3.2.3 in Aubin and Frankowska [1990]) to attain the existence of a fixed point
(y∗, q∗).1 In fact, using the logic of that proof, we can allow for continuous admissible valuation functions
(as defined in Veraart [2018]) Vki (y
k
i /p¯
k
i ) ∈ [0, 1] with payments LkijVki (yki /p¯ki ) from firm i to j in asset k.
In this paper, we exclusively consider the continuous admissible valuation function VEN (z) = 1 ∧ z+ for all
firms and all assets. We refer to Veraart [2018] for further discussions on admissible valuation functions and
the relation to bank distress and bankruptcy costs. For simplicity, we focus on the stronger assumptions
introduced in Assumption 3.10 for the remainder of this paper.
Remark 3.13. Note that we allow (and likely enforce) firms to both buy and sell assets during a fire
sale, this is in contrast to earlier works such as Cifuentes et al. [2005], Amini et al. [2016], Feinstein [2017],
Feinstein and El-Masri [2017]. Such an approach is necessary to consider the cross-currency obligations
exhibited in many systemic crises (e.g., Dell’Ariccia et al. [2011]). In such a setting, firms will transfer
between the currencies or, more generally, assets in order to satisfy the different obligations. That is, for
instance, a firm in the United States may need to sell US dollars for euros in order to fulfill European
liabilities, while a European firm may enact the reverse transaction within the same international financial
system. Further, we allow for solvent firms to use their excess wealth in order to maximize their utility. By
allowing this, the contagion effects of a fire sale could be partially mitigated if firms purchase an asset in
a fire sale (or sell an asset being bought in excess). The extreme mitigation in which the system has no
net changes in currency holdings (i.e., all sales by one firm are purchased by a separate firm in the system)
follows the model of Eisenberg and Noe [2001] with no illiquidity; this extreme mitigation occurs when there
is a symmetry in endowments and obligations between the assets or currencies. In contrast, the fire sales
1This statement is formalized and proven in Theorem 3.2 of an older preprint version of this text available at
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1702.07936v2.pdf .
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can have a large impact on the health of the various firms when there is an asymmetry in the system (e.g.,
between US dollars and Thai baht during the 1997 Asian financial crisis as discussed in Allayannis et al.
[2003]).
3.3 Attained equilibrium in m = 2 asset case
In general, uniqueness of the clearing holdings and prices is not guaranteed. We refer to Example 3.15 below,
which provides an illustration of multiple clearing solutions under the setting of Example 3.5, i.e., a simple
two asset network. However, though there may exist more than one clearing solution, the system can only
attain a single equilibrium. This section will focus on the tâtonnement process by which an equilibrium is
attained after the initial shock occurs in the m = 2 asset scenario.
Consider an initial price shock q0 ∈ [q, q] generated by asset transfers γ0 ∈ Rm. Initially the firms would
want to reach y∗(q0), but as they implement these transactions they will impact the prices in a continuous
way. In particular, the prices will update along the direction of difference between the “desired” price and
the current price, i.e., beginning from q0
dqt =
[
F
(
γ0 +
n∑
i=1
(xi + [p¯i ∧ y∗i (qt)]− y∗i (qt))
)
− qt
]
dt. (6)
The attained clearing solution is exactly the asymptotic solution of this process, if it exists. This procedure
is often called the tâtonnement process in the economics literature (see, e.g., Bluhm et al. [2014]).
We wish to emphasize that although the set of clearing solutions given a shock q0 may not be a singleton,
(assuming convergence) the tâtonnement process can only reach a single clearing solution. Importantly,
because the set of clearing solutions is not unique, it will frequently be the case that the attained clearing
solutions (as a function of the initial shock q0) will be discontinuous. These points of discontinuity match
exactly those stresses in which a financial crisis becomes a systemic crises. That is, if a marginal change
in initial shock can cause a radically different clearing solution to be attained. We refer the reader to
Example 3.15, and in particular to Figure 3, for a demonstration of such an event. This discontinuity is
fundamentally a result of the nonuniqueness of equilibria. As an initial stress grows too large, the system may
not be able to sustain a financially stabilizing equilibrium anymore as firms enter insolvency and, therefore,
a jump in equilibria occurs to a more extreme outcome. Such events are systemic as they are purely a result
of firm insolvency that cannot be captured by looking solely at the aggregate of the financial system.
Proposition 3.14. Consider the setting of Assumption 3.10 with only m = 2 assets. The tâtonnement
process (6) will converge to a clearing solution.
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This tâtonnement process, ultimately, provides the attained clearing solution which includes market
impacts from the individual firm behaviors. As mentioned previously, these market impacts can have either
mitigating or exacerbating effects which cannot be captured by the Eisenberg-Noe framework with exogenous
shocks only. As we will investigate in numerical case studies in Section 5, the choice of regulatory framework
and utility functions will affect the clearing solutions. As a rule of thumb, and as expected, small shocks
may be “absorbed” by the system, while large shocks are likely to be exacerbated and may potentially drive
the price to the upper or lower bound.
Example 3.15. Consider the network with n = 2 banks and m = 2 assets depicted in Figure 2 with
parameters considered in Example 3.5. Consider linear price impacts on the second asset, i.e., F2(z) =
q
2
∨ (1 − bz2) ∧ q2 for some lower bound q2 < 13 , upper bound q2 > 3 on the prices, and price impact
b ∈ (0, 1). The set of clearing prices, as a function of the initial shock size q0 ∈ [q, q], are given by
Q∗(q0) =


{q0(q0)} if q2 ≤ q0,2 < −b+ 2
√
b
{q0(q0), q↓(q0), q↑(q0)} if − b+ 2
√
b ≤ q0,2 ≤ 2b+ 13
{q↑(q0)} if 2b+ 13 < q0,2 < 3− 23b
{q1(q0)} if 3− 23b ≤ q0,2 ≤ q2
where the candidate clearing prices are provided by
q↑(q0) =
(
1,
1
2
[
q0,2 + b +
√
q20,2 + 2b(q0,2 − 2) + b2
])T
q↓(q0) =
(
1,
1
2
[
q0,2 + b −
√
q20,2 + 2b(q0,2 − 2) + b2
])T
q0(q0) =
(
1, [q0,2 − 2b] ∨ q2
)T
q1(q0) =
(
1,
1
2
[
q0,2 +
√
q20,2 + 8b
]
∧ q2
)T
.
We wish to note that q↑((1, 3− 23b)T) = q1((1, 3− 23b)T), so only one clearing solution exists at q0,2 = 3− 23b.
Though multiple clearing prices exist for q0,2 ∈ [−b + 2
√
b, 2b + 13 ], a unique price is attained using the
tâtonnement process. This selector from the set of all clearing prices can be determined as a function of the
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Figure 3: Example 3.15: A comparison of the set of equilibrium prices Q∗ to initial shocks q0 with the
attained equilibrium q∗ highlighted.
initial shock q0 ∈ [q, q] to be given by
q∗(q0) =


q0(q0) if q2 ≤ q0,2 < −b+ 2
√
b
q↑(q0) if − b+ 2
√
b ≤ q0,2 < 3− 23b
q1(q0) if 3− 23b ≤ q0,2 ≤ q2
.
Of particular note, q∗ is discontinuous at q0,2 = −b + 2
√
b in general. This provides the important notion
that the system can, roughly, absorb a shock of size −b+2√b (with some exacerbating tendencies), but any
shock larger than that will cause a near complete collapse of the system. We refer the reader to Figure 3
which displays the set of clearing prices Q∗ and the attained clearing price q∗ as functions of the initial
shock q0 where q2 = 0.05, q2 = 5, and b =
3
8 . Both the full region of responses and a consideration of only
downward shocks in the second asset price are presented. Notably, at q0,2 = −b + 2
√
b ≈ 0.85 the attained
equilibrium price drops from roughly 0.6125 to 0.10. As such, this simple system can be viewed as being
able to withstand a 15% drop in asset prices, but no more.
4 Example payment utility and utility functions
In this section we present two possible choices for the payment utility function hi and three choices for the
utility functions ui which satisfy Assumption 3.10 and the additional conditions of Algorithm 3.4. For the
19
payment utility function hi we present quadratic formulations that correspond to:
• Surplus transfers: a firm only transfers from one asset to another if there is a surplus to exchange.
• Prioritization with proportional payments: a firm transfers all wealth to asset 1 first until that obligation
is paid off in full, then attempting to fulfill obligations in the second asset, and so on through the µth
asset, then attempting to fulfill all other obligations paying out in proportion to the total liabilities.
As special cases, this setting includes both asset prioritization (i.e., all assets are ordered and given
a strict seniority structure for repayment) and proportional payments (i.e., the amount of obligations
filled follows the same proportion as the total liabilities).
For the utility function ui we present three options with clear meaning:
• Minimal trading: a utility function such that firms choose to see how markets respond in the immediate
aftermath of the crisis in order to determine their investment response, i.e., firms seek to minimize the
total amount of trading between assets (once the rules to find the payments Pi are taken into account).
• Asset maximizing: a utility function encoding a flight-to-quality which seeks to maximize the total
number of units of a specific asset, at the expense of all other assets.
• Value maximizing: a utility function which is given by the value of the final portfolio holdings of the
firm since firms typically trade assets in order to maximize return on equity. In particular, this utility
function attempts to maximize the total pre-crisis wealth for a firm.
4.1 Sample payment utility functions
Here we will consider the details of two possible, meaningful, options for the choice of payment utility
functions hi in (1). These are a surplus transfer rule and a prioritization of the first µ assets and proportional
payments for the remainder rule. Both of these sample payment utility functions satisfy Assumption 3.10
and the conditions of Algorithm 3.4.
Example 4.1. Consider a regulatory framework in which a firm is only forced to transfer assets if there is
a surplus that is not being used to cover obligations already. In an international financial system, such a
regulatory framework would naturally exist if each (independent) regulatory body places priority on its own
currency. Any institution operating in multiple nations would be forced to follow the local regulations with
their locally held endowments. However, once a firm has satisfied all obligations in a currency, the regulatory
requirements therein have been satisfied and they may exchange the surplus to any other currency still in
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deficit. One possibility to describe this framework is represented mathematically by the quadratic payment
utility function hi : [0, p¯i]× R(n−1)×m+ × [q, q]→ R defined by:
hi(pi; y−i, q) := −1
2
(ci − pi)T diag
([
q1
c1i − e1i
,
q2
c2i − e2i
, . . . ,
qm
cmi − emi
]T)
(ci − pi)
ci = p¯i ∨ ei + δ
eki = x
k
i +
n∑
j=1
akji
[
p¯kj ∧ ykj
]
(k = 1, 2, ...,m).
The δ ∈ Rm++ term that appears is to shift the center of the ellipsoidal level sets of hi rightward and upward
from the maximum between the amount owed p¯i and the amount held (pre-transfers) through market clearing
ei. The δ is introduced solely to avoid a division by 0 in this representation of the surplus payment utility
function. In fact, this payment utility function is chosen such that the level sets are ellipsoids with center
above both p¯i and ei, and such that the gradient of hi is q at ei.
Example 4.2. Consider a regulatory framework in which a prioritization scheme is applied to the first
µ ∈ {0, 1, ...,m} assets, and all other assets are treated in equal proportion after those first µ assets are
paid in full. In the special cases that µ = 0 this is a purely proportional payments regulation scheme, i.e.,
pro-rata. In the case that µ = m this is a purely prioritized payments regulation scheme, i.e., a seniority
structure as in Elsinger [2009]. This may arise if asset 1 is the local currency due to regulations favoring
those payments. Financial institutions will pay off their balance in asset 1 (including by transferring funds
from all other assets), and only after that obligation is fulfilled will they begin filling asset 2 and so on down
the line until they pay off asset µ. Only after asset µ is paid off in full will the other obligations be paid,
which will be done in proportion to the obligations for assets µ+1 through m. Mathematically we will define
the payment utility function hµi : [0, p¯i]× R(n−1)×m+ × [q, q]→ R by
hµi (pi; y−i, q) := −
1
2
(ci − pi)T diag


[
q1
c1i − s1i
, . . . ,
qµ
cµi − sµi
,
qµ+1
cµ+1i − πp¯µ+1i
, . . . ,
qm
cmi − πp¯mi
]T (ci − pi)
ci = p¯i + δ
ski = p¯
k
i ∧
(∑m
j=1 qje
j
i −
∑k−1
j=1 qjs
j
i
)+
qk
(k = 1, 2, ..., µ)
π =
[(∑m
k=1 qkp¯
k
i
) ∧ (∑mk=1 qkeki )]−∑µk=1 qkski∑m
k=1 qkp¯
k
i −
∑µ
k=1 qks
k
i
eki = x
k
i +
n∑
j=1
akji
[
p¯kj ∧ ykj
]
(k = 1, 2, ...,m).
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As with the surplus payment utility function, we choose the quadratic form to create ellipsoidal level sets
with center ci (above p¯i), and such that the gradient of hi is q at the point on the feasible line where all
wealth is in asset 1 if less than p¯1i , or p¯
1
i wealth is in asset 1, and so on until asset µ, and the remaining
assets are along the proportionality line.
4.2 Sample utility functions
Here we will consider the details of three possible, meaningful, options for the choice of utility functions
ui in (2). These are the utility function that leads to minimizing the total size of transfers, the utility
function that prioritizes holding a specific asset, and the utility function given by the pre-fire sale priced
final wealth of the firm. All three of these sample utility functions satisfy Assumption 3.10 and the conditions
of Algorithm 3.4.
Example 4.3. Consider the case where firms wish to make the smallest possible trades in order to meet
their obligations, and trade no more once that occurs. Such a setting may be appropriate when a firm is
concerned about uncertainty in the rightful exchange rates. With such uncertainty a firm may choose to
minimize their own impact and wait for the market response to take shape before responding. Essentially,
this is a “wait and see” approach to investing during a crisis. Firms would then choose to rebalance over
time as prices fluctuate after the crisis studied in this work. Due to the static nature of the model studied
in this work, this allows us to capture the immediate aftermath of a crisis but not the long term effects that
may be felt. We can define the utility function for (2) by
ui(ei; y−i, q) := −
∥∥∥∥∥∥(xki +
n∑
j=1
akji[p¯
k
j ∧ ykj ])k − ei
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
.
That is, the holdings for firm i after trading would be the closest feasible point (based on the Euclidean
norm) to the initial network model before trading occurs. In particular, by definition of the norm, ui is
jointly continuous, strictly concave, and supermodular in its first component.
Example 4.4. Consider the case where a firm may wish to maximize their holdings in a specific asset
k∗ ∈ {1, 2, ...,m} at the expense of all other assets. In a systemic crises, firms may choose to sell higher risk
assets or currencies in order to purchase safer ones in a flight-to-quality. This has occurred in practice during
currency crises such as the 1997 Asian financial crisis when firms bought US dollars due to the collapse of
local currencies despite the market moving against them in such transactions. This can be modeled by a
firm wishing to maximize the holdings in the safe asset at the expense of all others. We can define the utility
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function for (2) by
ui(ei; y−i, q) := e
k∗
i − p¯k
∗
i .
That is, firm i will solely seek to maximize their holdings in asset k∗, without consideration of any other
assets. In particular, this is trivially jointly continuous, concave, and supermodular in its first component.
Example 4.5. Consider the case where firms wish to maximize their own net worth (in the numéraire)
given the pre-fire sale prices. Such a setting is appropriate when a firm has the belief that the pre-fire sale
prices are the “true” value of the assets. In such a view, any change from this price is due to the current
crisis, but will rebound to the pre-fire sale prices after the crisis is over. Thus a firm would wish to purchase
assets at a discount (or sell at a premium) in order to obtain a good deal. In this case we seek to maximize
ui(ei; y−i, q) := (ei − p¯i)T F (0),
which is jointly continuous, concave, and supermodular on the domain of interest. Additionally, under the
condition that Pi is a singleton (as in the assumptions of Lemma 3.1), we can recover the resultant utility
maximizer Yi(y, q) is unique so long as q 6= λF (0) for every λ ∈ R++.
Compare this utility function to the welfare maximizing utility, i.e., when a regulator wishes to maximize
the welfare of the aggregate system of financial institutions as measured by
∑n
i=1 ui(ei; y−i, q) over all firm
holdings ei simultaneously. With this utility function, since firms are purchasing asset k if qk < Fk(0)
and selling if qk > Fk(0), the Nash equilibrium clearing prices will correspond with the welfare maximizing
clearing prices since firm behavior will be identical under both considerations.
5 Numerical case studies
In this section we will consider two numerical implementations of the financial contagion framework con-
sidered in the prior sections. The first study is a toy implementation of the example payment utility and
utility functions presented in Section 4 to demonstrate how they affect the attained equilibrium prices. We
will then implement a brief study of the European financial system, calibrated with data from the European
Banking Authority, to compare the equilibrium solution under a single currency (as in Eisenberg and Noe
[2001]) to the counterfactual under which the Greek drachma were reinstated during an actualized Grexit
event.
Example 5.1. For a first illustrative example, consider a network with two currencies. As assumed through-
out this work, let the first currency act as the numéraire asset, i.e., F1 ≡ 1. To model the market impacts,
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let the inverse demand function for the second currency be given by
F2(z) =


fˆ(z2) if z2 ≥ 0
1
fˆ(α−1(−z2))
if z2 < 0
for fˆ(z) =
3 tan−1 (−z) + 2π
2π
where α(z2) := z2fˆ(z2) is the number of units of the first currency being purchased when z2 ∈ R units of
the second currency are being sold. See Remark 3.9 for a discussion of the symmetry argument inherent in
this choice of inverse demand function.
We will consider a system with 20 firms and a societal node, as introduced in Corollary 3.2. As this
is an illustrative example only, we will consider a single realization of a random financial network. In
both currencies, independently, each pair of firms has a 25% probability of having a connection of size
1. Additionally, every firm owes 1 of both currencies to the external node, which owes nothing back into
the system. All firms begin with i.i.d. random endowments uniformly chosen between 0 and 20, which
is then split evenly between the two currencies. For demonstration purposes to show how the different
regulation schemes and utility functions alter the equilibrium of the system as the initial shock q0 varies, we
consider the surplus, priority, and proportional regulation schemes (Examples 4.1 and 4.2 with µ = 2 and
µ = 0 respectively) under the minimum trading utility function (Example 4.3) and value maximizing utility
function (Example 4.5). In each scenario the societal node will follow the minimum trading utility function.
Additionally, for illustration of the set of clearing solutions, we will also show all equilibrium prices without
any initial shock, i.e. q0 = F (0) = (1, 1)
T, for the different regulation schemes and utility functions.
Figure 4 displays the prices attained from the tâtonnement process q∗2(q0) given an initial price of q0 =
(1, q0,2)
T both with and without market impacts. We note that the attained process need not be continuous
in the initial price q0. Note that only a single curve for the value maximizing utility is shown as all three
payment utility schemes produce virtually indistinguishable curves under that utility. Further note that under
the value maximizing utility the unique equilibrium price is given by the unshocked price F (0) = (1, 1)T for
nearly any initial price q0 and mitigates the shock for any initial price. Additionally, the value maximizing
utility produces a continuous equilibrium response as a function of the shocked price q0. We would also like
to point out that the attained clearing prices need not be continuous (as also demonstrated in Example 3.15).
It appears that all three regulatory environments jump equilibria at low values of q0,2. Specifically, under the
minimal trading utility function, the surplus payment utility function jumps equilibria at qs0,2 ≈ 0.605 from
q∗2(q
s
0 + ǫ) ≈ 2.695 to q∗2(qs0 − ǫ) ≈ 0.364. Similarly, the priority payment utility function jumps equilibria at
qµ=20,2 ≈ 1.413 from q∗2(qµ=20 + ǫ) ≈ 2.956 to q∗2(qµ=20 − ǫ) ≈ 0.285. Finally, the proportional payment utility
function jumps equilibria at qµ=00,2 ≈ 0.875 from q∗2(qµ=00 + ǫ) ≈ 3.001 to q∗2(qµ=00 − ǫ) ≈ 0.331.
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Figure 4: Example 5.1: A comparison of the attained clearing prices both without market impacts and with
market impacts under surplus, priority, and proportional regulation schemes in a 2 currency system under
minimum trading and value maximizing utility.
For demonstrative purposes, we display the set of all clearing prices and defaulting banks under the four
scenarios in Table 1 under no initial shock, i.e., q0 = F (0). We would like to point out that the priority
regulatory scheme, under the minimum trading utility function, results in a unique equilibrium in this
setting, with the equilibrium price being near the lower bound q
2
= 14 . This is due to the forced liquidation
of currency 2 for currency 1, which creates a significant asymmetry in the trading not present in, e.g., the
proportional regulation scheme. We further note that the surplus regulation scheme, though symmetric in
construction, is asymmetric in equilibrium. This demonstrates the concept that the particular realization
of the network plays a significant role in directing symmetry (i.e., higher liabilities or lower assets in one
currency will skew the equilibrium results). Finally, the proportional regulation scheme results in multiple
clearing solutions thus providing a counterexample to uniqueness of the joint clearing holdings and prices.
Notably, choosing different regulatory and utility functions causes different firms to default in equilibrium.
Example 5.2. Let us now consider an example calibrated from data. We will calibrate a network model to
the 2011 European banking dataset from EBA that has been used in prior studies (e.g., Gandy and Veraart
[2017], Chen et al. [2016]) under the financial contagion framework of Eisenberg and Noe [2001]. Though we
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Utility Regulation Price q∗2 7 8 9 10 13 16 17 19
Minimum trading
Surplus 3.2324 X X X X X
Priority 0.2812 X X X X X X
Proportional
0.3340 X X X X X X
0.7625 X X X X X
3.1252 X X X X X
Value maximizing Proportional 1.0000 X X X X X
Table 1: Example 5.1: A comparison of clearing price and defaulting firms without initial shock, i.e.,
q0 = F (0), under the surplus, priority, and proportional regulation schemes in a 2 currency system under
minimum trading and value maximizing utility.
utilize this dataset to have a more realistic network, the approach for calibration still requires heuristics, as
such this example is still for demonstrative purposes only.2
As a stylized bank balance sheet, we will consider two categories of assets: interbank assets
∑n
j=1 Lji and
endowments xi. We will additionally consider three categories of liabilities: interbank liabilities
∑n
j=1 Lij ,
external liabilities Li0, and capital ci. First, we will briefly discuss how to calibrate the Eisenberg and Noe
[2001] model, i.e., when all values are denominated in the numéraire asset only. The EBA dataset pro-
vides information on the total assets Ti, capital ci, and interbank liabilities
∑n
j=1 Lij . To determine
the variables necessary for the Eisenberg and Noe [2001] model we will assume, as in Chen et al. [2016],
Glasserman and Young [2015], that the interbank liabilities equal interbank assets
∑n
j=1 Lij =
∑n
j=1 Lji.
We will, however, modify this condition slightly as discussed in Gandy and Veraart [2017]; we will perturb
the interbank assets a small amount to satisfy a technical condition of Gandy and Veraart [2017]. Addi-
tionally, we assume that all assets not a part of the interbank assets are endowments and all liabilities not
capital or owed to other banks are owed to the societal node 0. Under these assumptions, given the provided
values, we determine the remainder of the stylized balance sheet via
xi := Ti −
n∑
j=1
Lij , Li0 := Ti −
n∑
j=1
Lij − ci, and p¯i := Li0 +
n∑
j=1
Lij .
Under this calibration, the net worth of firm i is equal to its capital, i.e., ci = Ti − p¯i.
In order to complete the Eisenberg and Noe [2001] system, we need the full nominal liabilities ma-
trix L. This, however, is not provided in the EBA dataset. Thus we will utilize the methodology of
Gandy and Veraart [2017] in order to estimate one such matrix consistent with the asset and liability
data discussed above. We consider a single realization of the nominal liabilities matrix L given the al-
gorithm of Gandy and Veraart [2017] with parameters p = 0.5, thinning = 104, nburn-in = 10
9, and
λ = pn(n−1)∑n
i=1
∑
n
j=1 Lij
≈ 0.00122.
2Due to complications with the calibration methodology, we only consider 87 of the 90 institutions. DE029, LU45, and SI058
were not included in this analysis.
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First, as a baseline model, we run the financial contagion model of Eisenberg and Noe [2001] to determine
the “factual” response in the scenario that Greece remains in the Eurozone and thus only a single currency
is utilized. In this scenario, assuming no external stresses, we find that none of the 87 banks would default
on its obligations; this comports with reality since none of the firms failed in late 2011. Additionally, as this
model only considers a single asset, there are no fire sales evidenced either.
Now, we wish to consider the counterfactual scenario in which Greece were not a member of the Eurozone
and had its own currency, the drachma, once more (i.e., the Grexit scenario). In order to update the
calibration to include both the euro and drachma, we need to consider also the total (non-sovereign) exposures
that each bank has to Greece GEi.
3 For notational simplicity let N = {1, 2, ..., 87} be the set of all banks
and G ⊆ N be the set of the six Greek banks in the EBA dataset. Then using the calibrated assets and
liabilities to the Eisenberg and Noe [2001] framework (henceforth denoted xEN and LEN ) we update the
assets and liabilities to be
x1i := x
EN
i −GEi, x2i := GEi ∀i ∈ N\G
x1i := 0, x
2
i := x
EN
i ∀i ∈ G
L1ij := L
EN
ij , L
2
ij := 0 ∀i ∈ N\G ∀j ∈ N ∪ {0}
L1ij := L
EN
ij , L
2
ij := 0 ∀i ∈ N ∀j ∈ N\G
L1ij := 0, L
2
ij := L
EN
ij ∀i ∈ G ∀j ∈ G ∪ {0}.
where the first asset is the euro and the second is the drachma. That is, the assets of the non-Greek banks
are denominated in drachmas for the amount that was exposed to Greece and the rest remains denominated
in euros. In contrast, all endowments held by Greek banks are re-denominated in the drachma. Additionally,
obligations from a Eurozone bank to the societal node is denominated in the euro and all obligations from a
Greek bank to the societal node is denominated in drachmas. Finally, all interbank liabilities between two
Greek banks is re-denominated in drachmas, otherwise all interbank liabilities remain in euros.
In incorporating two assets we need to discuss the inverse demand function. Consider an inverse demand
function of the form of that in Example 5.1. That is, let the first asset (euro) acts as the numéraire asset,
i.e., F1 ≡ 1, and let the inverse demand function for the second asset (drachma) be given by
F2(z) =


fˆ(z2) if z2 ≥ 0
1
fˆ(α−1(−z2))
if z2 < 0
for fˆ(z) =
4 tan−1 (−bz) + 3π
3π
3Sovereign exposures to Greece were orders of magnitude smaller and thus their inclusion would not have significantly
affected the final model.
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where b ≥ 0 is the market impact parameter and α(z2) := z2fˆ(z2) is the number of units of euros being
purchased when z2 ∈ R units of drachmas are being sold. See Remark 3.9 for a discussion of the symmetry
argument inherent in this choice of inverse demand function. We will first consider setting the market impacts
to a fixed level, i.e. b = 10−4, then considering the effects of changing the price impacts.
Finally, we need to consider some payment utility and utility functions for this setting. We will consider
that all firms will follow a priority regulation scheme (Example 4.2 with µ = 2) in which they prioritize
obligations in the local currency due to the preferences of the regulators. That is, Eurozone banks will
prioritize payments in the euro and Greek banks will prioritize payments in the drachma. Additionally, we will
assume that all firms (and the societal node) will follow the minimal trading utility function (Example 4.3).
This follows from the presupposition that the initial exchange rate (without loss of generality set to F (0) =
(1, 1)T) would not be trusted by the various institutions due to fear of fire sales of the new drachma. Therefore,
due to uncertainty in the “true” exchange rate, firms will be conservative and do as little trading as necessary.
If instead we supposed that firms would want to maximize their assets in the euro as a flight-to-stability
(Example 4.4) then we would see a total collapse of the drachma value but similar final results.
Now, with the multiple currency network calibrated to the setting that Greece was forced out of the
Eurozone, we can simulate this systemic event. For this case study we will only consider the setting without
an initial shock, i.e. q0 = F (0) and γ0 = 0, and with price impacts given by b = 10
−4. Due to the
choice of priority regulation scheme, the response to external stresses to the value of the drachma (i.e.,
with q0,2 < 1) would only marginally impact the final equilibrium. Figure 5a displays the updated prices
F (
∑n
i=1(xi + [p¯i ∧ y∗i (q)]− y∗i (q))) given an initial price of q = (1, q2)T after one iteration of the fixed point
problem. We note that the resultant curve is continuous because of the continuity of the both the inverse
demand function and the unique holdings y∗(q) (see the proof of Corollary 3.11). The marked point on the
curve shows the equilibrium price of q∗ = (1, 0.44331), i.e., after clearing the value of the drachma would fall
to 44.331% of its former value compared to the euro. At this equilibrium price, we found that three banks
would fail, though none of these banks were situated in Greece. This is due to a large amount of Greek
bank liabilities (interbank and to society) being drachma denominated and thus insulated from the fall in
drachma value.4 However we found that both banks from Cyprus included in this dataset (Marfin Popular
Bank and the Bank of Cyprus) and the Banco Comercial Portugues would fail due to large exposures to
Greece.5 While the Cypriot banks had, in relative terms, an order of magnitude more exposures to Greece
than any other non-Greek bank, the Banco Comercial Portugues had the third highest relative exposure to
Greece. Thus we are able to see that a crisis focused on Greece, with an endogenous stress to the rest of
4Though the greater Greek economy would likely suffer under such a large currency move.
5We would like to note that all three of these defaulting banks received a bailout or government intervention in either 2012
or 2013.
28
the Eurozone, is able to spread to institutions in the rest of the Eurozone. In particular, if our study had
coupled the Grexit event with some exogenous stress to the different banks balance sheets, as would likely
occur in such an event, we would find a larger number of defaults in both the Eurozone and Greece.
We wish to finish this example by considering the effects of changing the price impact parameter b which
previously was fixed at 10−4. All other parameters are kept constant from the previous considerations.
Notably this includes the assumption that there is no initial crisis and all price movements are the result
of the actions of the firms under consideration. Figure 5b displays the attained equilibrium prices under
changes to the price impact parameter b. Notably even a small level of price impacts causes a large drop in
the value of the Greek drachma in relation to the euro. This provides us with a level of confidence in the
determined results we found for the price impact b = 10−4 even though this inverse demand function was
not calibrated to data in the manner that the balance sheets were.
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Figure 5: Example 5.2: Graphical representations for fire sale prices of the Greek drachma denominated in
euros under a priority regulation scheme and minimum trading utility without any initial stress.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we considered an extension of the financial contagion model of Eisenberg and Noe [2001] to allow
for obligations in more than one asset. In doing so, we have written a mathematical model that incorporates
more realistic elements to financial contagion including obligations in multiple currencies and allowing for
solvent firms to purchase or sell assets beyond those required to satisfy obligations (as is generally assumed
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in, e.g., Cifuentes et al. [2005], Amini et al. [2016], Feinstein [2017], Feinstein and El-Masri [2017]). Under
markets without price impacts, we proved the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium portfolio holdings
in which each firm is a utility maximizer. We then generalized this result to prove existence of clearing
prices in markets with price impacts. Additionally, we consider the tâtonnement process to determine which
equilibria to which the market would converge in the 2 asset setting. Numerical case studies were undertaken
to demonstrate the utility of the proposed model and how the choice of payment regulatory framework may
impact, e.g., the realized exchange rates. In particular, we consider a stylized example of the European,
and specifically Greek, financial system under the counterfactual condition that the Greek drachma were
reinstated.
A Proofs for Section 3
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Fix q ∈ Rm++.
(i) Define Gi : [0, p¯i] → R to be the linear mapping Gi(pi) = qTpi for any pi ∈ [0, p¯i]. Noting that the
(convex) budget constraint of Pi(y, q) is equivalently given by
pi ∈ G−1i



−∞, m∑
k=1
qk

xki + n∑
j=1
akji
[
p¯kj ∧ ykj
]



 .
Further, the upper bound from the budget constraint is nondecreasing in y. Utilizing the strict con-
cavity of the payment utility function hi to guarantee the uniqueness of the maximizer Pi(y, q) for any
y ∈ Rn×m+ , it follows that Pi(·, q) is nondecreasing by Corollary 2(ii) of Quah [2007].
Now we wish to show that Yi(·, q) is nondecreasing as well. That is, Yi(y, q) ≤ Yi(y′, q) for any
y, y′ ∈ Rn×m+ with y ≤ y′. Take y, y′ ∈ Rn×m+ with y ≤ y′. If Pi(y, q) 6= p¯i then, by construction and
the monotonicity of the payment function Pi(·, q), we find
Yi(y, q) = Pi(y, q) ≤ Pi(y′, q) ≤ Yi(y′, q).
Let Pi(y, q) = p¯i (and thus Pi(y
′, q) = p¯i as well by the monotonicity of Pi(·, q)). Now define Gi :(
p¯i + R
m
+
) → R as the same linear map as above, i.e., Gi(ei) = qTei. As with the payment function,
30
the feasible regions for Yi(y, q) and Yi(y
′, q) can, respectively, be provided by
G−1i



−∞, m∑
k=1
qk

xki + n∑
j=1
akji
[
p¯kj ∧ ykj
]



 ,
G−1i



−∞, m∑
k=1
qk

xki + n∑
j=1
akji
[
p¯kj ∧ y′kj
]



 .
Again, the upper bound for this interval is nondecreasing in the portfolio holdings parameter. Under
the assumption that Yi(y, q) and Yi(y
′, q) are unique maximizers, we apply Corollary 2(ii) of Quah
[2007] to find Yi(y, q) ≤ Yi(y′, q).
Finally, we apply the Tarski fixed point theorem (see, e.g., Theorem 11.E of Zeidler [1986]) to the
mapping Y (·, q) : Rn×m+ → Rn×m+ to recover the result.
(ii) From (i) we know that (y↑i (q) − p¯i)+ ≥ (y↓i (q) − p¯i)+. By way of contradiction, assume there exists
an institution i and asset k such that (y↑ki (q) − p¯ki )+ > (y↓ki (q) − p¯ki )+. This immediately implies∑n
i=1 q
T(y↑i (q)− p¯i)+ >
∑n
i=1 q
T(y↓i (q) − p¯i)+ by qk > 0 for every asset k. However,
n∑
i=1
qT(y↑i (q)− p¯i)+ =
n∑
i=1
qT(y↑i (q)− [p¯i ∧ y↑i (q)])
=
n∑
i=1
(qTxi +
m∑
k=1
qk
n∑
j=1
akji[p¯
k
j ∧ y↑kj (q)]− qT[p¯i ∧ y↑i (q)])
=
n∑
i=1
qTxi +
n∑
k=1
qk
n∑
j=1
[p¯kj ∧ y↑kj (q)]
n∑
i=1
akji −
n∑
i=1
qT[p¯i ∧ y↑i (q)]
=
n∑
i=1
qTxi +
n∑
j=1
qT[p¯j ∧ y↑j (q)]−
n∑
i=1
qT[p¯i ∧ y↑i (q)]
=
n∑
i=1
qTxi =
n∑
i=1
qT(y↓i (q)− p¯i)+
where the last equality follows by applying the same operations to y↓i in the reverse order. This provides
our contradiction and thus (y↑i (q)− p¯i)+ = (y↓i (q)− p¯i)+ for every bank i.
Proof of Corollary 3.2. First, if bank i has positive equity, then by Lemma 3.1(ii) it immediately follows
that y↑i (q) = y
↓
i (q). In particular this must be true for node 0 as it has positive equity by definition. For
notational purposes, let E+ := {i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} | y↓i (q) ≥ p¯i} be the set of firms with positive equity. Let
us assume there exists some firm i 6∈ E+ and asset k such that y↑ki (q) > y↓ki (q), then immediately the
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mark-to-market value of the equity of the societal node 0 satisfies
qTy↑0(q) =
m∑
k=1
qk
∑
j∈E+
akj0p¯
k
j +
m∑
k=1
qk
∑
j 6∈E+
akj0y
↑k
j (q)
>
m∑
k=1
qk
∑
j∈E+
akj0p¯
k
j +
m∑
k=1
qk
∑
j 6∈E+
akj0y
↓k
j (q) = q
Ty↓0(q).
But this is a contradiction to y↑0(q) = y
↓
0(q).
Proof of Corollary 3.11. First, we wish to prove that, given uniqueness (guaranteed by Corollary 3.2) of the
portfolio holdings under a fixed price q, the equilibrium holdings y∗ : [q, q]→ Rn×m+ are continuous. Theorem
A.2 of Feinstein et al. [2017] guarantees that the graph of y∗ is closed in the product topology. Now we note
that the range space that the holdings can attain is, in fact, the convex and compact set
∏n
i=1 E¯i where
E¯i =
m∏
k=1

0, 1
q
k
m∑
l=1
ql

xli +
n∑
j=1
aljip¯
l
j



 .
Therefore, by the closed graph theorem (see, e.g., [Aliprantis and Border, 2007, Theorem 2.58]) continuity is
proven. This allows us to directly apply the Brouwer fixed point theorem (see, e.g., [Aliprantis and Border,
2007, Corollary 17.56]) to find an equilibrium price
q∗ = F
(
n∑
i=1
(xi + [p¯i ∧ y∗i (q∗)]− y∗i (q∗))
)
.
Proof of Proposition 3.14. Define α : [q, q] → Rm by α(q) := ∑ni=1 (xi + [p¯i ∧ yi(q)]− yi(q)). Additionally,
consider V : [q, q]→ R to be provided by
V (q) := γT0 q +A(q)−
m∑
k=1
∫ qk
1
f−1k (p)dp
where A : [q, q]→ R is defined as the multivariate function with gradient α. For the moment we will assume
that A exists, at the end of this proof we show this is the case under the restricted m = 2 asset setting.
With this construction we find that d
dt
V (qt) is negative semidefinite for any trajectory qt of the tâtonnement
process, i.e.,
d
dt
V (qt) =
(
γ0 + α(qt)− F−1(qt)
)T
(F (γ0 + α(qt))− qt) ≤ 0.
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This is because [γ0 + α(q) − F−1(q)]k ≥ 0 if and only if Fk(γ0 + α(q)) ≤ qk since Fk(γ0 + α(q)) = Fk(γ0 +
α(q) − F−1(q) + F−1(q)) and the monotonicity of the inverse demand function. In fact, d
dt
V (qt) = 0 if and
only if qt is an equilibrium price due to the same preceding argument. By LaSalle’s invariance principle (see,
e.g., [Khalil, 2002, Theorem 4.4]), the set of accumulation points of any trajectory is equivalent to the set
of equilibrium prices. Further, since qt ∈ [q, q] for every time t ≥ 0, the tâtonnement process approaches the
set of clearing prices as t→∞.
Finally, we wish to guarantee the existence of the function A : [q, q]→ R so that its gradient is equal to
α. For this purpose we restrict ourselves to the m = 2 asset setting since, functionally, we can consider our
input q to be its second argument only (due to our choice of numéraire). That is, we can consider instead
V (q2) = γ0,2q2 +
∫ q2
1 α2(p)dp−
∫ q2
1 f
−1
2 (p)dp.
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